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    War Diary: 1st Battalion The East Lancashire Regiment

    Month and year: September 1944

    The 1st Battalion The East Lancashire Regiment September 1944 War Diary covers the units advance from France into Belgium.

    National Archive Reference: WO 171/1330

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    Page 1 of 16
    PlaceDateHourSummary of Events and InformationReferences to Appendices
    1stThe Bn was put at 2 hrs notice to move. This was frequently changed throughout
    the day however, and finally it was fixed that there would be no
    move today. Majority of the day was therefore spent in maint and adm generally.
    2ndThe day brought the supreme example of order, counter-order, and almost
    disorder. The Bn was first of all at one hour's notice to move from 0900 hrs.
    This was then changed to 2 hrs notice to move from 1100 hrs. This was
    changed later to 3 hrs notice, When the head of the Bn was preparing to
    move off, we received the message "All moves delayed 2 hrs". Routes were
    changed continually until finally nobody believed anything about anything.
    he Bn finally got on the move at 1340 hrs setting off on a journey of
    some 65 miles. There ensued halts of anything up to an hour or more. 3 hrs
    were spent in covering half a mile of road. In one place the road was
    found to be cratered, and heavy rain which fell in the evening and night
    made it impossible to go round this obstacle. The route lay through
    FLEURY LA FORET, GAILLE FONTAINE 5935, ABANCOURT 7039, CAMPS, crossing
    R.SOMME, LONGPRE 8974, and finishing at DOMQUER 9484. Before the SOMME
    was crossed, however, the route was changed and so was the destination.
    The route was changed first of all to go through POIX 8646 and then to cross
    the river at PICQUIGNY. At POIX, heavy damage to a bombed airfield was
    observed and a few horse-drawn pieces of artillery were seen. Before the
    R. SOMME was crossed the destination was altered to DOMART 9979. The Bn
    again made many diversions due to the correct route being blocked by traffic,
    and finally arrived at 0700 hrs to harbour there. It was found that the
    harbour party under Capt. H. Carter had suffered one casualty, Pte Edwards,
    who was sniped. As a result of a search, two prisoners were taken.
    Page 2 of 16
    PlaceDateHourSummary of Events and InformationReferences to Appendices
    30500The Bn arrived in DOMART about 0500 hrs. It was found that Capt. Carter with
    the Harbour Party had fought a private battle with some German Snipers. One
    DR of the Harbour Party was wounded and the locality which we had been ordered
    to harbour in had been changed to DOMART. At various times throughout the
    day the Bn was ordered to move, and the order was countermanded, The Bn
    eventually passed the SP at 1700 hrs that evening with orders to proceed
    through ST. POL to VALHOUN where the Bn would form up facing NW and take the
    area of SAINS. The Recce Regt were supposed to be in front to report ST. POL
    and VALHOUN clear or otherwise, The Bn advanced and made contact with the
    Recce Regt long before they reached ST. POL, which was declared by the latter
    to be still held by the Germans and they had had no patrols into ST.POL.
    This caused some delay, but as supply vehs were proceeding freely northwards,
    the Bn pushed on and proceeded through ST. POL without incident, it being held
    by a unit of another Bde.
    40300We arrived at ST.POL, where we halted to get information. From ST.POL we
    lined up for an advance to VALHOUN with the Carrier Pl leading, moving off
    from ST.POL at 0345 hrs. About 200 yds from VALHOUN, the Carriers were
    fired on by an A tk weapon. They then took up a position of neutralisation
    and awaited a bn attack. The bn attack went in at 1000 hrs with 'D' Coy left
    fwd, and 'B' Coy right fwd. 'D' Coy managed to get as far as the church
    fairly easily, but 'B' Coy ran into heavy opposition, and although they killed
    a lot of Germans in the narrow lane, themselves suffered some 20 cas. The
    attack was so held up that a plan was made to put in 'C' Coy supported by a
    battery of 12 x 2" Mortars. Zero hour for this attack was 1100 hrs. This
    attack did not materialise as by the time details for centralising amn and
    Mors and getting 'C' Coy into posn had been arranged, the enemy had withdrawn
    from VALHOUN and the Bn was free to commence its attack on SAINS.
    Page 3 of 16
    PlaceDateHourSummary of Events and InformationReferences to Appendices
    4Meanwhile 'C' Coy had had a lot of cheap fun, for at first light, purely by
    accident, Capt. Stockings had seen movement in a house, had yelled to this
    person to come out, whereupon, the figure did, and was followed by one more
    German Officer and 94 Other Ranks.
    While the Bn was at VALHOUN, one sec of Carrs went fwd to recce the area
    of TANGRY and SAINS bringing back 148 prisoners and reporting the area clear.
    The Bn then moved towards their objective which was SAINS. The CO preceeding
    the column in order to prepare lay out of his Bn area. 15 mins after arrival,
    the CO and his command gp were fired upon by MGs and snipers, also a 75 mm
    A tk Gun, which destroyed one Jeep and 2 M/Cs. Command Gp after fighting
    fiercely for half an hour, withdrew into the village of TANGRY fighting all
    the way. The situation was saved by the arrival of 'D' Coy led by Major
    Lake, who were pushed round the right flank and occupied a position on the
    North side of the village. 'A' Coy then assumed station on the
    left of 'D' Coy facing North and West. 'C' Coy assumed responsibility for
    the West and Southern approaches to the village, while 'B' Coy occupied a
    reserve posn on the south side. The task of the bn was to cover the roads
    from north and west of SAINS to prevent the enemy breaking out of the pocket,
    which included the coastal strip around LE HAVRE. A determined gp of snipers
    remained in the centre of the village in some houses there, defying all efforts
    to push them out until they finally withdrew during the night.
    5Reports came in during the day of enemy being located in the woods North and
    West of SAINS. 'C' Coy with one sec of carrs was sent out at 1800 hrs to
    determine whether the woods to the north were clear, and if they were not,
    to clear them, The Coy returned at 2130 hrs having met no enemy.
    Lt. Hawkins liberated the village of ............. having gone slightly off
    his route. At 1700 hrs the Coy of L.Fs. commanded by Major Tomlinson
    left to join 7 RWF.
    Page 4 of 16
    PlaceDateHourSummary of Events and InformationReferences to Appendices
    6The Bn moved to FLEURBAIX just south of ARMENTIERES via PERNE and BETHUNE,
    arriving at 1500 hrs. The reception along the route can only be described
    as tumultous. Men were laden with flowers and fruit, in fact the only thing
    the population seemed to be short of was cigarettes. At FLEURBAIX the Bn
    was well looked after by the local inhabitants, This move was done on tpt
    provided from within the bde and attached tps., 10 X 3 tonners being provided
    by one of the other Bns and one coy riding on the quads and guns of 330
    Bty commanded by Major MacIndoe. 'HQ' travelled on the Carden Lloyds.
    7080010 X 3 tonners and 20 X 15 cwts were despatched to the two other bns in the
    bde to move them NE of ARMENTIERS. Owing to traffic delays in ARMENTIERS
    crossing a blown bridge, tpt had not arrived back until 1900 hrs, and the Bn
    was only able to move from 2030 hr's arriving at 2230 hrs at COMMINES where
    it took up defensive posns facing NW for the night. As it was feared that
    enemy from the direction of YPRES, should they not decide to surrender, might
    decide to break out to the SE. The night was uneventful however.
    80400At 0400 hrs 'O' Gp was called and orders were given for the advance of the
    Bn with the Bde Gp to ANTWERP. Our TCVs arrived during the night. Our
    Harbour Party of 45 Offrs and men left at 0630 hrs. The Bn passed the SP
    at 0930 hrs and with many delays followed the route which lay through
    COURTRAI, OUDENARDE, ALOST and ASSCHE. Road discipline was poor and this,
    combined with deviations of route, not only delayed the Bn but split it up with
    the result that it finally arrived in the dock area of ANTWERP at 0300 hrs
    9th. Total distance involved was some 100 miles, and in spite of the
    defection of the fitter's truck, all vehs arrived in by 0900 hrs.
    Page 5 of 16
    PlaceDateHourSummary of Events and InformationReferences to Appendices
    90400By this time the In had taken over posns completely from 2 Devons in the
    ANTWERP dock area. 'A' Coy right fwd in some large flats at 688995, 'D' Coy
    left fwd coy in the area 678988 guarding some bridges, 'B' Coy were in reserve
    and also assisting in the defence of a vital bridge which was still intact at
    691992. 'C' Coy were entirely isolated but were supported by MGs and a tp
    of tanks, defending the sluice gates in the area 625028. These gates were
    vital to the docks, since their destruction would drain the basins, and the
    absence of such a volume of water it was alleged would cause the dock sides
    to cave in. A trace showing the Bn area is attached, also attached are
    two aeriel photographs which show in the top left hand corner the block of
    flats held by 'A' Coy and in the top right corner, the village known as
    POLDER and the barracks which were occupied later by 'C' Coy. The enemy
    at this time was 719 Div.
    10A conference was held at Bn.HQ during which a plan was given to take the
    village area 6800 and ECKEREN 6802, this battle to take place 11/12 Sep, and
    one hour after its start 160 Bde would advance on the right through FORT DE
    MERXEM to the wooded area 720030. In order to make this bn attack, 'C' Coy
    had to be withdrawn from the sluice gates posn. This took place on the
    night 10/11, whereupon 'C' Coy went into reserve using unoccupied buildings
    in 'D' Coys area.
    11During the early morning, while it was still dark, patrols were sent out by
    D' and 'A' Coys. Information brought was sufficient to establish that
    POLDER was still held, but at 1100 hrs it appeared the enemy had retired
    from there according to civilian information. During the afternoon,
    therefore, an attack was made on POLDER. It was an attack by infiltration,
    C' Coy leading, going via the dock side south west of POLDER, thence into
    the village and north to the Barracks at the North end of the village
    Page 6 of 16
    PlaceDateHourSummary of Events and InformationReferences to Appendices
    11with one pl, leaving two pls in the area 688004. 'D' Coy followed and
    occupied a posn immediately on their right in the area 689005, 'B' Coy occupied the
    SE corner of the village, 'A' Coy remaining in their flats together with two
    secs of MGs and the 3" Mors in bty. Bn. HQ moved forward to the flats as
    soon as it was clear that the obj was being easily taken. The only opposition
    during the whole attack came from shell-fire, generally 88 mm and the attack
    cost the Bn five cas.
    12A pl from 'B' Coy took over posn in the barracks from a pl of 'C' Coy, the
    switch being completed by 0612 hrs. During the morning the RAP was brought
    up to 'D' Coys old posn in the Docks. During the day, the only opposition
    was again from shelling and mortar fire. Meanwhile, preparations were still
    being made for the possible attack to the east towards FORT DE MERXEM and
    LAER, both of which were held by the enemy. The attack on ECKEREN was now
    considered impracticable after study of the ground in view of deep floods,
    the canal, and the wire defences of ANTWERP which had previously been erected
    by the Germans. Consequently, as a result of civilian information received,
    B' Coy was sent on a patrol at 2130 hrs and located a flimsy plank bridge
    over the canal at 689003.
    During the day the enemy had been observed in the area east of the bn posn,
    in the buildings on the western edge of BREMSTRAAT at about 1500 hrs. Patrol
    therefore went out this night into the area to obtain identification but
    although many signs of enemy were found, no live enemy were encountered.
    13Pl from 'D' Coy took over Barracks position at 1st light
    During the day some faily heavy shelling came down on the
    village and due to the flimsinesss of the buildings some
    casualties were caused to 'C' Coy, incl CSM Daley
    During the night, Lieut Fitchett took a fighting patrol
    out to the canal immediately North of the Barracks to secure
    an identification. This was not obtained but more useful
    knowledge of the defences was gained and emeny were found
    to have established a post on the south side of the canal.
    This post was not seen at all by daylight.
    14Again, at first light, the pl in the barracks was changed over, 'A' Coy
    finding the pl for this day. It was considered impracticable and unfair to
    leave a pl in there more than 24 hrs. Again, much enemy movement was
    observed both to the north in ECKEREN and to the NE and again they were fired
    upon with good results.
    Page 7 of 16
    PlaceDateHourSummary of Events and InformationReferences to Appendices
    14At 1100 hrs, the Bn was visited by reps of 1 HLI, and arrangements were made
    for the Bn to move out to a rest area in a Military Depot to the south of
    Antwerp the following morning, the relief by 1 HLI to be completed by 0600 hrs.
    At 1700 hrs, however, this was entirely altered. We were informed that the
    relief had to be carried out by midnight, and that the Bn would be carried
    in tpt to the Military Depot where it would spend the few remaining hours of
    the night, after which it would pass the start pt on a 30 mile move not before
    0800 hrs. Reconnaissance parties were immediately sent off to the new area,
    unfortunately this party was not the same as the one which reconnoitred the
    barracks earlier in the day, with the result that when the Bn arrived at the
    barracks at 0340 hrs 15 Sep, everyone was strange to the building, and chaos
    reigned for a little while. The relief was completed at 2330 hrs 14 Sep
    and by 0100 hrs 15, the Bn was concentrated by the rly sta in ANTWERP. 8
    Tp Carriers were, of course, missing from the column, and therefore, men
    had to be put on carrs, Carden Loyds, and quads, a process which was
    completed by 0210 hrs.
    15On arrival in the Military Depot, the bn snatched a few hrs rest and then
    had to rush past the SP at 0855 hrs, eventually arriving at EYNTHOUT 087820
    at 1200 hrs. There the bn stayed for the night. Most of the time was spent
    getting some sleep after the practically sleepless previous night.
    16During the night the bn again received orders to move, this time to the area
    of LOMMEL, and the bn passed the SP at 1335 hrs. There were many halts on
    ORDER OF MARCH Appx 'J'
    this journey due to the fact that bridges over the canals which lay ahead
    were blown and the Cl. IX bridges had to be closed frequently for maintenance.
    The Bn finally arrived in the area of LOMMEL and established Bn.HQ at 308932
    at 1715 hrs. Meanwhile, the CO had been called fwd to Bde HQ at 1500 hrs
    Page 8 of 16
    PlaceDateHourSummary of Events and InformationReferences to Appendices
    16and from there had immediately set out on a reconnaissance of the Meuse-
    Escaut Canal which ran some 2 miles North of LOMMEL from East to West. At
    1930 hrs 'B' Coy had to send one pl to relieve a tp of the Recce Regt who
    were guarding the br at 3297. The bn spent a peaceful night in its conc
    area. Plans for crossing of the canal water obstacle were given out at
    2130 hrs and preparations made for reconnaissance the following morning by
    all subordinate commanders. 158 BDE OO No 14 recd - Appx 'G'
    17At 0700 hrs, first Recce Parties set out for the canal and were followed
    later at 1000 hrs and by second Recce Party, so that everyone down to sec
    leaders had a chance to observe the crossing in daylight. The canal was
    about 130 ft wide with steeply sloping banks and a bund on both sides. This
    latter, together with a continuous plantation of young fir trees, facilitated
    the reconnaissance, but limited the choice of crossing places to only two
    possible sites. As a result of the Bde 'O' Gp at 1000 hrs a plan was made
    for the bn to cross the canal on a two coy front, 'D' right, 'C' left,
    'A' and 'B' following leading coys respectively. A coy of the 2 Mons,
    commanded by Major Genese was detailed to provide covering party, to carry
    boats and to ferry the bn across. Arty sp on the Bde front was provided
    by 7 Fd Regts and 2 Med Regts. 4.2" Mors were also used and MMG were given
    the task of protecting the flanks of the crossing. 'B' Coy's pl was
    relieved by a sec of carrs, 2 sec of carrs were employed on the right of 'D'
    Coy's crossing place, one was employed on the left flank in addition to a
    pl of 2 Mons. 3" Mors were not given tasks.
    Cl.V Raft was to be built at each crossing place, the right raft by the Bn
    Pioneers, the left raft by a det of the REs. Zero hr was fixed at 0030 hrs,
    but about midday it was put forward to 2330 hrs. Bn moved to its assembly posn
    one mile to the S of the Canal at 1600 hrs and remained there till 2030 hrs
    when the leading rifle coys moved fwd to the F.U.P. which was 600 yds S of
    Page 9 of 16
    PlaceDateHourSummary of Events and InformationReferences to Appendices
    17the Canal, Rafting stores were dumped at the F.U.P. at 1930 hrs together with
    assault boats, 16 boats in all being provided. This allowed for the crossing
    on each coy front by 4 boats, keeping one boat in reserve, the remaining
    6 being reserved for the rafting operations.
    At 2215 hrs, Bn.HQ moved fwd to the F.U.P. The night was very dark with
    some rain and all movement was slow. At 2315 hrs, the sp wpns opened fire
    and for the next 20 mins the night was filled with the noise of the barrage,
    rattle of the MGs, and the crash of concentrations of Mors. In all this
    noise enemy fire passed unnoticed, except on the right where the 7 RWF's were
    were similtaneously crossing the canal, and Spandeau fire became more and
    more insistent. The barrage continued in lessening intensity for two hrs.
    Meanwhile, under this umbrella of flying metal, the inf advanced. At 2330
    hrs the first boats touched the waters of the canal.
    As has been said, the night was very dark and the drenching rain rendered it
    quite impossible to see for more than a few yards.
    It was found that watermanship had not been studied by those two had recently
    joined and the steep banks made loading and unloading the boats most
    dangerous and difficult.
    Two boats sprang leaks and sank, and despite the efforts of Majors Griffin
    and Lake and Capt. LeCocq, who swam to the rescue, two men were drowned;
    losses would have been heavier but for the efforts of these officers.
    On landing and continuing the advance, the Bn became lost in the dense forest.
    There is just no other explanation. The low visibility outside the forest,
    became NIL, once Coys entered and started to push their way through the
    thickly planted trees. Fortunately the enemy could see no better than we could,
    and only stray bursts of Spandau disturbed the blind coys as they staggered
    and stumbled forward in close formation on compass bearings.
    Bn.HQ followed 'A' Coy on the right, and on advancing over the bank, fell
    into an enemy trench and took 5 prisoners.
    Page 10 of 16
    PlaceDateHourSummary of Events and InformationReferences to Appendices
    17Bn.HQ first made contact with 'D' Coy and soon after with 'A' & 'C' in a
    ride which was heavily trenched by the enemy, but unoccupied. Into these
    trenches, in the pitch blackness of the night, the men were constantly
    falling when they moved about.
    17When it became light enough to see the Bn found itself approximately on
    the obj and this was of course a miracle, even so, coys had changed places
    in the dark, and left rear turned out to be in right fwds place.
    No sooner had it become light than the enemy became active and it was
    found that the bulk of the enemy was now between us and the canal.
    The Rafting and Bridging sites came under heavy fire from the edges of
    the woods and all rafting and building ceased. The Bn had to: (1) Hold
    its present obj (2) Turn about and with strong battle patrols clear the
    enemy pockets which were holding up further crossings of the canal.
    The fighting was very confined and continued all day, and much good work
    was put in by 'A' & 'C' Coys in attacking small posts in the wood, and
    isolated fortified houses.
    Major Griffin, OC 'A' Coy, laid on and led at least 4 separate battles
    during the morning and on one occasion drove the enemy back on to the LMG
    and rifle fire of the remainder of the Bn, where they were affectively
    dealt with. Eventually the area was cleaned up and bridging and rafting
    continued.
    The Bn, still wet through and without food, commenced patrolling forward
    and re-organizing,
    Quite a number of prisoners were taken, most of these wounded, for the
    Paratroops fought hard and with great skill.
    Bn casualties amounted to about 30 & included Major Genese, Major Nicoll,
    Lieut Sharlot, Capt Carter and Capt.Tull.
    Page 11 of 16
    PlaceDateHourSummary of Events and InformationReferences to Appendices
    18The Bn now concentrated in the woods north of the canal, 'C' Coy sending a
    standing patrol to the North supported by carriers, Ay 2000 hrs, as it was
    getting dark, the sound of planes was heard overhead and bombs started to
    fall. Most of these were anti-personnel bombs, only a few HE being dropped.
    'B' Coy suffered the only two casualties, one man being killed. 'C' Coy
    had a very narrow escape when a long line of these A. P. bombs plastered the
    area within a hundred yards of them. ORDER- 'OP "BEECHER"' RECD -
    APPX 'I'
    19The Bn was now ordered to attack westwards to enlarge the bridgehead and
    ensure that the crossings were not under SAA fire. The advance was made mid-
    morning morning, 'A' Coy leading . The route lay along the canal bank to
    some extremely thick woods which were dissected by rides. Opposition by GAF
    personnel was patchy and though not heavy they resisted until it was obvious
    that they would either be surrounded or killed. Some 40 prisoners were taken
    during this operation for the cost of a dozen casualties to the Bn. The Bn
    took up defensive positions in this area for the night. A right, C left,
    facing west, with D and B on the right flank facing north. Bn HQ managed
    to find a small house near the canal.
    20The day passed completely quietly for the Bn, though 1/5 Welch passing along through
    the canal bank met the same opposition that we had met the previous
    day. The plan at this time was that the Bn should advance in support of
    1/5 Welch up to the line of the small canal some 3,000 yds ahead. The Bn
    received orders to move northwards and embussed to the area of Eersel and
    Duizel. The Bn left the area of the bridge at 1930 hrs as it was growing
    dark, and all went smoothly until within 2 miles of EErsel. By this time the Bn was
    moving along a narrow lane in pitch darkness, vehs became ditched, and to crown it
    all a br along the route was found to be incapable of taking the heavy traffic of the
    Bn. There was nothing left for it but to turn around and the Bn arrived and took over
    from 1 HLI at 0400 hrs.
    Page 12 of 16
    PlaceDateHourSummary of Events and InformationReferences to Appendices
    21The Bn eventually succeeded in extricating itself from the impasse, causedPersonal Message from C-in-C received Appx. 'H'
    by the weak bridge, arriving at EERSEL 3109 and DUIZEL 3010 at about 0300
    hrs. This delay of 6 hours was due to false information and lack of road
    recce. The take over from 1 HLI was complete by 0530 hrs, 'C' Coy being
    forward in DUIZEL and the remainder of the Bn back in EERSEL.
    At 0900 hrs a sec of carrs was ordered fwd to hold a bridge taken by the
    Recce Regt at 278108, At 1200 hrs the Bn was suddenly ordered to put a
    coy into HAPERT 2710 believed to be empty. 'B' Coy therefore made an
    attack with sp from carrs, mors, A/tk guns and with 'D' Coy following up.
    No casualties were caused to our tps and enemy estimated at one pl was cleared
    from the village. 'D' Coy left one pl at the bridge 265100 while 'B' Coy
    stayed in the village. Lieut Fitchett took out a patrol incl one RE offr
    to find enemy locations and data about the river, ready for an attack on
    BLADEL for which the In was warned that evening. There was no other
    activity during the night.
    22Orders were given out at 0700 - 0800 hrs for an attack on BLADEL 2410.Appendix 'A'
    Before crossing the SL, 'D' Coy came under Spandeau fire from the right flank,
    and this had to be silenced before the advance would carry on on the right.
    The attack went slowly but well, 11 prisoners only being taken, and the Bn
    reached its obj by 1250 hrs. Copy of the Rear Link wireless diary is attd-
    Appx
    Ramps were constructed down the banks of the stream by REs and Pioneers,
    and the fwd coys soon got their sp arms. The building of these ramps was
    interfered with by snipers who were cleared by shell and mor fire.
    The enemy subjected the Bn including Battle HQ to intermittent Mortaring &
    Shelling. In retreat he was also heavily mortared and shelled with good
    effect by observed fire.
    1840Recce met heavy fire on road HARPERT - BLADEL and all traffic on road for the
    night was suspended from 1930 hrs.
    Page 13 of 16
    PlaceDateHourSummary of Events and InformationReferences to Appendices
    221900B' Coy carrier slipped through and was not fired on. All other coys had
    to rely on hospitality of villagers for food and this was given freely.
    Known casualties for day were 4 ORs killed, 1 Offr & 17 ORs wounded and 3
    ORs missing. In addition, one platoon of 'D' Coy pursuing the
    enemy went too far, were shot up, and only two returned, one wounded man
    being captured with a German S.B, and the other, after refusing to come
    out of an attic, and being fired at through the ceiling, returned 23 Sep.
    Lieut. Crewe and 18 ORs were missing as a result of this pl's action.
    7 RWF supplied one coy for defence of Bn. HQ in HARPERT for the night.
    AERIAL PHOTO OF HAPERT 'C'.
    23The four rifle coys remained in BLADEL forming a tight block in the centre" " " BLADEL 'D'.
    of the village. At 0800 hrs, REs, protected by a sec of 7 RWF and a sec
    of carrs, commenced building up the blown bridge across the stream. This
    was completed by 0930 hrs and at the same time, the carrs reported the
    BLADEL road clear. At 1100 hrs, Bn. HQ moved fwd into BLADEL having been
    replaced by a second coy of 7 RWF. BLADEL was full of would-be helpful
    partisans, but the problem of sifting good news from the mass of out of
    date infm proved too great and they had to be ignored with the exception
    of a few enthusiasts, who patrolled it at the request of the Bn, Such men
    were only sorted out from the crowd after a great waste of time.
    1900A curfew was imposed at nightfall, Nazi party members were handed over to
    the partisans who had replaced the local 'turncoat' police, Light barricades
    with mines below were set up across the streets. Contact was made with
    the local clergyman who spoke English, and he agreed to put these orders
    into effect. It was arranged that by day, everyone off the streets and
    shutters down, would indicate the presence of Germans in the village and that
    at night, a general breaking of the blackout would betoken the same. Patrols -
    APPX 'B'
    were sent out to HULSEL 2213 and DE HOEVEN 2210 from 'B' and 'A' Coys
    respectively.
    Page 14 of 16
    PlaceDateHourSummary of Events and InformationReferences to Appendices
    24There was little operational activity by enemy or own tps throughout the day.
    The Bn expected to be relieved at various times during the day by 4 RWF who
    were going to put a coy in posn in BLADEL. 4 RWF did not arrive at 1100 hrs
    1400 hrs 1600 hrs or indeed at all during the day. Meanwhile all preparations
    had been made for a move to HOOGELOON, which was recced for a Bn posn with
    2 coys isolated fwd, guarding the Bridge just West of CASTEREN.
    20001 pl of 'B' Coy was sent to relieve a pl of 1/5 Welch on the bridgeAppx 'E'
    near CASTEREN,
    2100Patrols sent out towards De Hoeven and Hurloel. Both located enemy posts,
    and reported these places occupied, one clash being made with an enemy patrol.
    4.2" Mors went from under comd in the evening.
    25The BLADEL area was shelled intermittently throughout the day, but only two
    casualties were sustained. The guns were believed to be ex-Russian 122 mm.
    1100A carrier patrol of 2 secs was sent out, under Sit Fish, in the late morning
    towards HULSEL as a result of reports of enemy received from civilians. These
    reports were not correct but enemy covering a road block were encountered.
    1400It gallantly went out again in the afternoon to try and find a member of the
    P.A.N. organisation, missing from the earlier patrol. He was recovered.
    It was later found that the Dutchman had NOT volunteered to guide the patrol
    as was thought.
    1500The MMG Pl was removed from the Bn area.
    24002 Patrols were sent out to HULSEL, but as warning had been received so late,
    the men had not seen the ground in daylight and most unreliable infm was
    received which could not be believed.
    26More shelling occurred during the night and at 0800 hrs. Meanwhile REUSEL
    on our left front had been secured by 4 Welch.
    1000A patrol was sent out towards HULSEL under Lt. Harper. No enemy were found
    Page 15 of 16
    PlaceDateHourSummary of Events and InformationReferences to Appendices
    26up to the patrols limit.
    The remainder of the day was without incident of note.
    Patrolling in the night to HULSEL met with no success.
    270800Bn came under 168 Bde.
    Nothing of importance occurred on the Bn front throughout the day. 4 Welch
    on our left withdraw at 1900 hrs and the Bn stood to during this. At the
    same time the Bn was warned that it would be relieved the following morning.
    After all arrangements had been made, timings were put forward one hour.
    28The relief of the bn by 4 Welch commenced at 0530 hrs and was completed
    except by 'A' Coy by 0630 hrs. The Bn concentrated at HAPERT leaving
    there in RASC tpt at 0730 hrs complete with Bn 'A' Ech via EINDHOVEN to
    APPX 'F'
    the area of ZANDHOEF 4431. The Bn moved less FOOs & Atk Regt. Recces were
    carried out and the Bn moved fwd to take up posn opposing the enemy in
    SCHIJNDEL at 1800 hrs. The take over from 1/7 Queens was completed by
    2100 hrs. The Bn had the sp of 258 Bty SP Atk Guns and 15 Pl RNFs.
    Bn. HQ was established in KOEVERING 4435. 'A' Coy right fwd 430367. 'B',
    centre 440363. 'C' Coy left fwd 433354. 'D' Coy immediately north of Bn.
    Transcription note: 430367 is 043367 in original document
    HQ. Bn was now once more under 158 Bde.
    290215An enemy patrol bumped the fwd pl of 'A' Coy. 1 German from 6 Pazas Regt
    was killed and the rest ran away. During the day, small groups of enemy
    were observed all along the front at intervals. Contact was made with an
    L.O. from 501 Para Regt (US Forces) on our right.
    1540A Typhoon attack with rocket and cannon was made in part of our posns. Aim
    was not accurate and 'A' narrowly missed suffering casualties from near
    misses. The moral effect of the rockets was 'terrific',
    Patrolling on the Bn front was limited to one Ambush patrol under Lt. Fitchett
    Page 16 of 16
    PlaceDateHourSummary of Events and InformationReferences to Appendices
    29which produced no results, and contact patrols at night.
    30Today was a repition of yesterday. Again enemy were heard and observed -
    again the intermittent shelling came down in the Bn area.
    During the night the same patrols were sent out. PATROL Report attached- -
    Appx 'K'.

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