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(a) His wireless could not get through to the control ship, and

(b) That in any event he considered fire support from the cruiser was unlikely to be forthcoming as too many calls were already being made from other FOBs. The Battalion Mortar Officer was forward in observation on Hill 30, mortars ranged and prepared to fire on time.

Little need be said regarding the actual infantry attack on Longueval as the locality was not held by the enemy and was occupied by the Battalion without opposition.

The Commanding Officer now decided to. attack Ste Honorine forth- with, leaving "C" Company as fire company on Hill 30, and "D" Company (Major A.J. Dyball) and the remainder of the Battalion in occupation of Longueval, the assault on Ste Honorine to be carried out with "A" Company (Major C.E. Vickery) and "B" Company (Major G.P. Rickcord). Orders for the attack were issued to Hill 30 by wireless. Zero hour was given as 1100 hours. The fire plan consisted of mortar concentrations on the forward edges of Ste Honorinc from Z - 15 minutes to Z and an artillery concentration Z - 3 minutes to Z plus two minutes.

The fire plan was proceeded with according to orders but zero hour passed with no sign of the assaulting infantry advancing towards Ste Honorine. An over-optimistic estimate of the time required to prepare for the attack had been made and the assaulting companies had not been allowed sufficient time for preparation and the giving out of orders. Zero hour was postponed until 1215 hours, but it was. not possible to postpone the original fire support plan owing to difficulty in communications. Notification of the postponement did not reach Hill 50 until 1110 hours. The postponement seriously affected the repetition of the fire plan as the mortars and MMGs were running short of ammunition and there was little time for replenishment. Determined efforts were made, however, and a small supply was obtained. During all this time "C" Company was under continuous fire from Ferdinand (88 mm SP gun) and mortars, and casualties were heavy. Shortly before the postponed zero hour seven enemy 75 mm SP guns (thought at the time to be tanks by all concerned) were seen from Hill 30 moving from the North—East to Ste Honorine. This information war, sent by wireless to Battalion HQ but owing to an unfortunate breakdown in communications did not reach the Commanding Officer.

Under cover of smoke "A" and "B" Companies advanced from the FUP across open ground towards Ste Honorine. The enemy position was penetrated to some depth but heavy MMG and artillery fire from SP guns inflicted considerable casualties and it was obvious to the Company Commanders concerned that a very gallant attempt to secure the position by the officers and men under their command, supported by very slender artillery and MMG fire, could not succeed. They were out of touch with Battalion HQ and were forced to fall on Longueval

The Commanding Officer gave instructions for "C" Company to withdraw from Hill 30, which was still under very heavy enemy fire, and concentrate with the reminder of the Battalion in the defence of Longueval.

The following casualties were sustained during the attack on Ste Honorine:-

Killed: Lieut J.D.A. Boustead and five other ranks.

Wounded: Lieuts C. O'Hara-Murray, D.A.S. Murphy, F.W. Hindson, W.E. Dean, H.R. Morgan and 64 other ranks.