- 3 -

SULLY is a little village in a valley, built around the bridge over the river. 0n the east a road runs parallel to the river 200 yds from the river bank 400 yds further east a second road runs parallel to the first. The village is approached. from the east by another road cutting the lateral roads at right-angles. On the right of the bridge are fields with banks and thick hedge-rows; to the left are houses. To reach the Chateau which stands on the western side of the valley it is necessary to cross the bridge and turn to the left, The country is very close. The roads are lined with tall trees and every field is boarded with steep banks and hedges.

For support in the attack the Bn was given One Field Regt, a medium Regt, a platoon of 4-2 mortars, two troops of tanks and a cruiser. The plan was for "A" Coy to make a firm base in the area of the forming up point, and for "B" Coy to pass through and capture all of the village on the eastern bank. "A" Coy was than to move through "B" Coy and. take the Chateau. The artillery was to put down concentrations upon the cross-roads, the area of the bridge, and upon the Chateau. The tanks were to give covering fire from the right flank. It was impossible to see the objective because of the close country and snipers. It was thought that "A" Coy might have to flight to reach the F.U.P. There was not time to patrol.

The attack went in at 1215 hrs. It was found that the cruiser could not fire because no satisfactory observation could be obtained. The tanks in the same way could find no position to give covering fire. The F.U.P. was chosen from the map turned out to be entirely exposed on the left flank. As time was short, "A" Coy could not clear the area, and "B" Coy were therefore unable to deploy into assault formation, but had to remain off the road. The artillery came down in a heavy concentration of the first cross-roads, which were heavily wooded; in consequence many shells burst: short and "B" Coy had to go forward in their own concentration. Finally, because there had been no reconnaissance and the operation was hurried, one platoon comd missed his way, and, instead of taking a track round to the right of the village, continued down the control road. However, the attack went in.

Opposition was met from some houses near the first cross-roads. An enemy machine gun fired at the leading troops, but was forced to withdraw by a determined section attack. The assault continued until, at the edge of the village, the company was held up by a body of enemy, an 88-cm gun and a 2-cm flack gun. The position was critical. The only cover available was the road which was sheltered by high banks, but, being the obvious approach, the road became a target for mortars and grenades. The company then split into two parts. The main body under Capt THOMPSON attacked the 88-cm frontally, while the Company Commander, Major J.T.BOON, with a mere handful of men, worked round the right flank and got behind the enemy position Major BOON reformed the Company, and cleared the whole of the area on the Eastern bank at the river, whilst Capt THOMPSON and Cpl 98 THOMAS led a dash across the open bridge and gained a bridgehead the other side. When this was reinforced, "A" Coy passed through and, swinging left attacked the Chateau; 7 and 8 platoons on the left, and 9 platoon on the right. 8 and 9 platoons under Lieuts POPE and REED almost got within assaulting distance of the chateau, but were halted at the end of the drive; Major DAUNCEY than brought up the tanks to fire at the castle. Shermans fired HE and Besa, and from the left of the drive finally set it on fire at the rear.