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There were innumerable lessons to be learnt from this attack. It occurred at a time when the Army's initial advance was losing impetus; the contact battle was merging into static warfare. Those are difficult and often expensive moments. In this case it is possible that the enemy were forming up for an infantry attack to coincide with the advance of the Mark VIs. Certainly the enemy were not deeply entrenched, but were using the natural cover and protection of hedgerow and ditch. In this thick leafy country the advantage is with the defenders, who can stay still and hold their fire until the last moment. Tanks are blind in this country. By 11 June the enemy was recovering from his first shook. He was fighting to the death. It was too late to plunge into deep unrecced country with insufficient knowledge of the strength or disposition of the enemy.

The Bn. occupied their new position for three days. Apart from sniping there was little enemy activity. Our 3" mortars fired effectively some good patrols were done. Our relief by the Hallams from 49 Division was disturbed by sniping and spandau fire and the last company to leave had to crawl for it.

We had 36 hours out of the line near CONDE SUR SEULLES. This rest area was surrounded by medium and heavy artillery who fired continually. But the Bn. benefited from a good night's sleep. Some reinforcements arrived including two Canadian officers under the CANLOAN scheme. The other ranks were of all sorts of regiments and tended to be the "bumph war increment" of bns. who had spent several years in England, including extra ration clerks, officers mess waiters and Q.M. storemen. Some of them were, however, good men and an asset to the Bn. Bn. H.Q. lived in a farm, where the owner lent us a room told us he was a cavalry officer "pendant deux guerres", hoped we would behave as well as the Germans and decorated his courtyard with a most attractive daughter.

We moved up West of the R. SEULLES through LA BELLE EPINE and were reserve Bn in a brigade advance in close country. The advance was halted and we sat in a defensive position, stopping occasional 'overs' from a tank. We were then pulled out and started a Bn. advance towards LA TAILLE and LONGRAYE with a squadron of tanks in support. The country was very close. The enemy were hard to locate. The leading platoon of A company was ambushed and two "Honey" tanks were lost. The advance eventually bogged down in very close country where we reorganized A further attempt to get forward while 1 DORSETS were attacking on our left failed in pouring rain. A new officer sent to us 'to command A company the previous day was wounded. We then remained in a defensive position in this area for some four days.

These advances had been carried but by using fighting patrols well in front, generally one platoon strong. Instead of using the open, troops advanced up the hedgerows. It was hard to use artillery except shooting "off the map" Tanks were useless except to hold off enemy counter-attacks It was warfare where the sniper came into his own. Lack of ammunition and artillery support held up the advance On the Divisional front. 50 Division had almost completed their task.

We spent up till 27 June in this defensive position. There was a dangerous tank counter-attack on our neighbours on the left. The 3” mortars find 150 bombs a day, constantly moving their positions so as to escape the consequences. Much patrolling was done, one patrol taking four or five prisoners of war and killing more Germans. The enemy's shelling increased, with artillery as well as mortars A Nebelwerfer straddled Bn. H.Q. and accurate small mortars caused casualties in the forward platoons. The 2 i/c of B Coy was killed by a sniper. But the predominant feeling was of fatigue. Officers and men were very tired indeed. The short nights and the constant drain of casualties was a continual strain. We were also lucky to have an excellent and understanding doctor who had joined us like the Padre. in the Primoaole Valley in Sicily, when their