effectively gone. It was a measure of the uncertainty of the High Command in the West that one of its most powerful armd formations was largely deprived of its offensive potentiality on the 6th June.

D-Day and the day following

17. It was between midnight and 0100 hours 6 Jun that Genlt FEUCHTINGER first heard the invasion had begun. Word was received from the forward bn of 125 Panzer GrRegt that parachutists had begun to drop in the area TROARN 1667 - TOUFFREVILLE 1368. Although technically the unit had ceased to be under his comd the moment the Allies touched down in FRANCE, he nevertheless ordered them to engage the parachutists at once. Because communications were maintained with this bn of 125 Panzer Gr Regt, he held on to them in the following stages at the battle. The Bn of 192 Panzer GrRegt West of the ORNE was, however, lost to him at that time. When it eventually returned it was worth little more then a company. The flak coy placed under comd or the CAEN flak staff was knocked out by ships' fire by noon of the 6th Jun. Of the twenty four 8.8 cm A Tk guns given to 716 IntDiv , twenty one had been ordered West from the high ground upon which Genlt FEUCHTINGER had placed them and they did not fire a single shot all during D-Day. The three remaining 8.8s that had been unable to change their position as ordered by 716 InfDiv claimed no less than twelve Allied tks during the landing.

18. From the moment Genlt FEUGHTINGER heard the news of the landing just after midnight until 0700 hours on the 6th Jun, not a single order was received by him from a higher formation. Thus, for six hours after our landing, the comd or the armd formation most immediate to the scene or operations was kept ineffectively and impatiently twiddling his thumbs. The order that he was not to make any move until he had heard from Army Gp B had been most definite. Nevertheless, at 0630 hours, unable to stand the inaction any longer, the general ordered his div to attack the English 6th Airborne Div which had by now entrenched themselves in a bridgehead over the ORNE. To Genlt FEUCHTINGER, this threat seemed to be the most pressing or all and he felt that the best use or his one hundred and seventy armd vehicles could be made in the elimination of this airborne force. At 0700 hours his first intimation that the higher Comd still existed was given when he was informed that 21 Panzer Div was now under comd of Seventh Army. No order as to its role was issued. Between 0900 and 1000 hours he was placed under comd of 84 Corps which already was overburdened with the affairs or 719.91.242,352 and 716 InfDivs . 12 SS Panzer Div (Hitler Jugend) the only other armd formation immediately available. was in the area MORTAGNEDREUX and as far as Genlt FEUGHTINGER knew, still under the direct comd of Panzer Gruppe West.

19. It was close to 1000 hours 6 June before 21 Panzer Div received its first operational order from a Higher comd. 84 Corps ordered the formation to stop its move against the 6th Airborne Div and turn West across the Orne where the forces protecting CAEN were rapidly disintegrating 22 Panzer Regt, the armd element, then moving North, had to suddenly change its direction with one battle gp crossing the ORNE at COLOMBELLES 0700 and another battle gp crossing the river at CAEN itself. In addition to 125 Panzer GrRegt already inextricably committed, the heavy company of the reconnaissance regt, the assault company and some engineers were lopped from the div and left to fight the Allied airborne force. with the hope of containing the bridgehead and hoping the CAEN - TROARN road clear.

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