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The tanks proved to be a squadron of 13/18 H (Shermans) and the meeting between the CO and the squadron commander, who was accompanied by his own CO; took place at the spot on the edge of the DZ which had been the battalion‘s RV after the drop. They met at 1.30 p.m.

It was raining hard at the time and conditions for reconnaissance were further complicated by the presence of an unusually large number of Germans in the gliders on the DZ. These were being kept under close observation by the troops in the vicinity, who were having quite a serious shooting match with them and did not appreciate the sudden appearance of various officers; complete with binoculars and a desire to study the battle field. It is only fair to add that the officers were none too keen either, but they could not do their job from anywhere else. The plan was eventually agreed to and the tank commander decided to do his approach and firing from the DZ side of the woods. The operation was to start at 4 p.m.

The troops moved off to their start point, which was at the extremity of the 13th Battalion's area, with B Company and Advanced Battalion HQ leading and were all ready, and in position to start, by 3.40 p.m.

The twenty minutes wait was spent chatting with the troops of the 13th Battalion during which a deal of good natured leg pulling took place on the subject of having to cell in the 7th to make things safer for the 13th. One of the most striking characteristics of the parachute troops was this feeling of great friendliness between the different units, which enabled them to give and take without any ill feelings on either side. The 13th Battalion accepted the jibs and retaliated by pointing out that the job was such an easy one that it had been considered safe to leave it to the 7th.

Punctually to time the tanks rumbled into view and with them the first problem arose. There were only two of them, but others could. be heard following; they were moving slowly and it was obvious that not more than the leading two would be in position by the right time. Would the next two come up and fire their two minutes worth on arrival, and regardless of time, or would they pass by without firing to engage the second target. The CO decided to hold B Company until he was quite certain that the tanks had finished firing, even if this meant delaying the start until after the pre-arranged time.

It soon became obvious that only eight tanks were going to appear and that these were employing tactics which were not strictly in accordance with the plan. The first two laid off from the first wood and fired into it exactly as planned, but the others went straight past and fired into the other woods as soon as they arrived which was, of course, well before the infantry could get there. As a result the Germans were completely shot up and many of them killed, but tanks remained stationary for anything up to twenty minutes and paid the penalty for doing so Five out of the eight were hit by anti-tank guns and went up in flames. Fortunately the crews escaped in each case but, from the Taxpayer's point of view, it was a very expensive operation.

B Company led off a few minutes after 4 p.m. followed by Advanced Battalion HQ. and found that the first wood was no more than an orchard and the second one not much thicker. They were ordered to take them both while A Company were moved onto the start line to tackle the displaced wood.