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Appendix ‘B' Continued.

At LE BAS de RANVIILE on more than one occasion it was only discovered that a Royal Artillery gun had been withdrawn overnight when the Commanding Officer or 'E‘ Company Commander made his early rounds of the defences. These removals inevitably implied some re-adjustments of battalion guns, and delay until the gap was satisfactorily closed.

(b) Enemy Snipers

Early action by Field Security Police to clear villages of undesir- able civilians or in giving direction in checking local inhabitants, would be appreciated.

The experience at LE BAS de RANVILLE was that troops suspected all civilians of being franc tireurs and accountable for any shots heard in the village.

Consequently, there was a desire to form uncontrolled sniper- hunting parties which in fact caused Alarm and despondency through their engaging what they took to be "sniper hideouts".

4. 12 JUNE

Action of 'D' Company at BREVILLE.

As far as the Company was concerned this was a most unfortunate occur- ence, and had it not been for the presence of Major WARREN, much harm might have been done in shaking the confidence of Other Ranks.

It is fully appreciated that quick attacks will have to be launched but to launch an attack with troops who have no knowledge of the objective, or who have had no opportunity to carry out even a brief Recce of the START LINE and approaches before the ground. is obscured by smoke, can only be wasteful and ineffective. Battle procedure can be speeded up or cut down but cannot be totally eliminated.

It is not sufficient for Commanders to know the objective etc, as they invariably become casualties. Time is required for all ranks to be advised.

5. 20 JUNE

Relief of a Battalion in the line.

The exchange of positions with 2 OXF & BUCKS at the CHATEAU de COME area was most satisfactorily effected. Training in this subject had been carried out at BULFORD and paid its dividend.

In principle, the more guides used the better, so that there is no confusion and loss of direction, and troops are not kept concentrated in areas subject to enemy harassing fire.

Two further principles were followed:-

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