(iv) Frequencies

The allotment did not provide for a single spare but such was the accuracy of the allotment that alternatives were not re- quired on grounds of interference.

It is ensential that all comd nets be in the 68 P/22 overlap band (2 to 3 MCs) to meet the requirements of re-grouping. For example, the 12 Para bn was successively under comd of div HQ and G Airldg Bde having started under its own (5 Para) bde.

(v) Wireless Equiptment

Only one 19 sot HP arrived and it was unreliable.

No 76 sets worked well.

No 22 sets worked well except for microphones which needed constant rest for drying out. This was overcome by covering them with a suitably thin rubber sheath.

No 46 sets worked Well. The inclusion of one crystal common to all sets was a very great advantage in establishing ad hoc nets for special requirements.

No 68P and R sets were satisfactory but there were many losses due to kitbags going adrift and the wide dispersion of para- chutists.

6. Re-supply

Airborne re-supply was very successful. The div was entirely dependent upon this source to make up initial losses of signal equipment.

OC Sigs controlled the issue of all signal equipnent from the div dump and vetted all demands daily (incl 18 and 38 sets).

7. (i) Lines

The policy was to lay lines as soon as possible and close down wireless.

Appx L shows the line diagram at D + 7.

Only one line det arrived at div HQ and this det (as did those with bdes) worked unceasingly laying and repairing under heavy shellfire day and night.

It was not possible to build securely with the number of linemen available. Bde secs have asked for a minimum of two dets each of six men.

Only when the situation had become static (about D + 10) was it possible to lay alternative routes and bury all lines radiating from HQs. All HQs were subject to intermittent shelling two or three times a day and invariably all lines were put out. In consequence, wireless could not close down before about D + 14, and even then control stas had to remain on listening watch.