(b) The airborne force must be landed sufficiently far in rear of the main enemy defences to enable it to get organised before it starts its work. The most value will not be obtained if we land it in an area full of German troops. Somewhere between 10,000 yards and 20,000 yards behind the front is thought to be correct.

(c) If it is felt that the attack by the main force is certain to succeed without the co-operation of the airborne force, then there is no justification for using 1 Airborne Division in that operation. It is a valuable expendable commodity and we must be quite sure that we are going to get the utmost value out of it.

"During the early weeks of the invasion all efforts must be concentrated to ensure that we do not get pinned down. The operation must be kept fluid. 1 Airborne Division must be held in reserve until it is clear that we may be unable to break out of the ring without its assistance. Then it must be used in conjunction with the main attack to make sure that we do break out.

"The timing of the use of 1 Airborne Division must depend upon the prospects of success, bearing in mind that there should be a junction between the main and the airborne forces within 24 hours. If the initial operation is a slow and difficult one involving the crossing of a major obstacle, forming a bridgehead across a river and afterwards constructing bridges, then it is a very risky business to use the airborne division at the start. If things go slower than we anticipate, it will generally be better to delay the airborne operation until it is clear that the bridgehead has been firmly established,

"If on the other hand, the initial attack is over suitable ground and is well supported in every way - if the prospects are really good - then it may be advantageous to use the airborne division during an early phase.